Preventing unauthorized physical access to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) installations has become an increasing security concern. In the past five years, there have been numerous cases of individuals—often foreign nationals from adversarial nations like China, and to a lesser extent Iran and North Korea—attempting to trespass onto military bases without permission. In this blog we explore recent trespassing incidents and their patterns, the policy and legislative responses to deter such breaches, and the best practices and emerging technologies for securing installations. We also briefly address the security concerns from drone incursions over DoD installations.
Table of Contents
- Case Studies and Recent Incidents of Base Trespassing
- Legislative and Policy Responses to Base Infiltrations
- Best Practices and Emerging Security Technologies
- Drone Incursions: A Related Emerging Threat
- Conclusion
Case Studies and Recent Incidents of Base Trespassing
Growing Pattern of Gate Crashers
DoD officials have tracked around 100 incidents of unauthorized installation access attempts by Chinese nationals in recent years. These individuals, often dubbed gate crashers, frequently pose as innocent tourists to test base security. A 2022 interagency review by the DoD, FBI, and others uncovered dozens of such cases, which authorities believe are a low-level form of espionage probing U.S. defenses. An FBI spokesperson warned that China is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign of theft and malign influence that violates laws and norms. Counterintelligence experts note that if intruders are caught, it’s hard to prove more than trespassing, and those who evade detection are likely to collect something useful. This underscores the challenge—perpetrators face minimal consequences while potential damage to security can be significant.
Notable Trespassing Incidents
Several high-profile cases of attempted unauthorized access to DoD installations illustrate the tactics used and the challenges of preventing trespasser access:
- Key West Naval Air Station (Florida): On multiple occasions, Chinese nationals were caught trespassing at a Naval intelligence center in Key West, even swimming in restricted waters to take photographs of military structures. In one 2019 case, a Chinese man entered the base and photographed critical equipment; he received the maximum 12-month sentence under current trespass laws. Days later, two more Chinese nationals snuck onto the base to photograph infrastructure and were similarly jailed. These incidents, which involved the FBI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), local police, and a Joint Terrorism Task Force, highlight how foreign agents exploit gaps in base perimeter security.
- White Sands Missile Range (New Mexico): Chinese visitors claiming to be tourists at the adjacent White Sands National Park intentionally wandered past the boundary onto the Army missile range to take pictures. They were stopped by security after capturing images of instrumentation and facilities. U.S. officials suspect such intrusions aim to observe military capabilities up close.
- Cape Canaveral (Florida): In another incident under investigation, Chinese nationals were found scuba diving near Cape Canaveral—home to Kennedy Space Center and military launch pads for spy satellites. This unusual approach by diver in murky waters highlights the unique challenges in preventing unauthorized access to DoD installations, raising alarms about covert reconnaissance of launch infrastructure and undersea cables.
- Fort Wainwright (Alaska): A group of Chinese nationals attempted to force their way through the gate at this Army base, claiming to have a hotel reservation on base—a ruse that was quickly debunked by guards. Fort Wainwright, housing the 11th Airborne Division for Arctic warfare, has seen multiple intrusion attempts given its strategic location. Service members in Alaska confirm that Chinese spies disguised as tourists have repeatedly tried to enter bases in recent years. In one case, intruders tried to speed past guards after being denied entry, prompting a high-alert response.
- Other Suspicious Attempts: U.S. officials also noted Chinese “tourists” straying from White House tours to photograph security posts and communications gear on the grounds. And in 2019, two Chinese diplomats, with their wives, drove onto a sensitive Virginia base used by Navy SEALs, bypassing gate security; they were stopped inside and quietly expelled from the U.S. for espionage concerns. That same year, a Chinese woman infamously infiltrated President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort with electronic devices, later being convicted of trespassing—an episode outside DoD but indicative of the broader espionage toolkit.
Involvement of Adversaries Beyond China
While Chinese nationals account for the bulk of recent unauthorized access incidents at DoD installations, U.S. bases have also confronted challenges preventing unauthorized trespassers from other nations. For example, in May 2024 two illegal immigrants from Jordan attempted to breach the gate at Marine Corps Base Quantico in a box truck. Base security arrested them after they ignored orders, and charges were later dismissed upon finding no terrorist affiliation. The case prompted lawmakers to question if such breaches could be dry runs for hostile actors.
Motivations and Tactics
Security officials assess that many of these unauthorized access attempts at DoD installations are state-directed espionage efforts to collect information on U.S. military operations. Trespassers often use cover stories and scripted excuses when stopped—claiming to be lost, looking for a fast-food restaurant, or having a wrong turn. In rural areas near sensitive installations, far from typical tourist routes, such excuses strain credulity. The consistent pattern of Chinese nationals appearing at remote bases testing security practices suggests a coordinated campaign.
As one former Senate Intelligence Committee staffer explained, China appears to be playing a numbers game—sending many operatives on low-level missions, knowing that even if a few are caught for trespassing, most will simply be evicted with no espionage charges. This low risk, high reward calculus is what makes physical infiltration attempts a persistent concern.
Senior U.S. officials, including those in the FBI and DoD, have publicly voiced concern. The FBI has labeled these unauthorized access incidents as a form of espionage aimed at observing DoD installation layouts and security responses. To date, few trespassers have been prosecuted beyond simple illegal entry, but counterintelligence and military police treat each incident seriously as a potential precursor to sabotage or intelligence gathering. The message from leadership is clear: physical intrusions are not harmless tourism—they must be viewed as deliberate hostile intelligence actions.
Legislative and Policy Responses to Base Infiltrations
Closing Legal Gaps—The GATE CRASHERS Act
Until recently, trespassing on a DoD installation was usually charged under an old law carrying minor penalties, often a fine or up to 6 months jail. This mild consequence is seen as insufficient to prevent repeat intrusions by trained agents. In response, Congress has moved to stiffen the penalties. In July 2024, Senator Ted Cruz introduced the Guarding and Administering Trespass Enforcement, Controlling Restricted Areas, and Stopping High-Risk Encroachment Recidivism and Sabotage Act (GATE CRASHERS Act). This legislation would make unauthorized access to DoD installations a federal crime with escalating penalties aimed at preventing incidents: up to 6 months imprisonment for a first offense, up to 3 years for a second, and up to 10 years for third or subsequent offenses.
“Foreign nationals have increasingly been caught trying to illegally access DOD installations. The criminal penalties they face are weak, they are clearly not deterred, and foreign adversaries…are seeking to exploit these weaknesses.” – Senator Ted Cruz
The GATE CRASHERS Act directly targets the espionage threat by ensuring that repeat intruders face felony charges and significant prison time, rather than a slap on the wrist. As of early 2025, this bill has been introduced in the Senate and referred to committee, with a companion measure anticipated in the House. Lawmakers from both parties on intelligence and armed services committees have signaled support for creating a stronger federal trespassing statute in the wake of the surge in base intrusions.
Other Congressional Efforts
In addition to criminal penalties, Congress is examining immigration-related measures and interagency coordination to prevent unauthorized access to DoD installations. Following the Quantico incident with Jordanian nationals, Rep. Morgan Luttrell introduced the Protecting Military Assets Act of 2024 to expedite the deportation of any illegal immigrants caught trespassing on U.S. bases. This bill aims to swiftly remove non-U.S. persons who might pose ongoing security risks after such breaches.
Similarly, Senator Joni Ernst has pushed to close loopholes that allow potential adversaries to enter U.S. territories without proper vetting. She spotlighted a visa waiver program in the Pacific islands that enabled Chinese nationals to travel to Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands without visas, some of whom then chartered boats to spy on U.S. bases in Guam. Guam hosts critical Air Force and Navy installations, and Ernst warned that unvetted access there is a gaping hole for Chinese espionage. In late 2023, she and colleagues urged DHS to end this parole program, insisting that Chinese visitors to Pacific territories should undergo the same State Department screening required for entry to the mainland.
DoD Policy Changes and Base Security Protocols
The Pentagon has responded by reviewing and tightening its own installation security policies. A DoD spokesperson noted that several base security reviews since 2018 have been conducted, some with interagency partners, designed for hardening installations against emerging threats and preventing unauthorized access.
A recent review specifically focused on the physical security of base entry gates and led to adjustments in protective posture. Bases have been directed to reinforce gate procedures, improve identification checks, and install better barriers where needed. Every day, across 1,400 base access points, DoD personnel perform more than 10,000 controlled turnarounds—denying entry to individuals without authorization. Most are resolved as routine, but now guards are trained to flag any encounter that seems suspicious or repetitive for further investigation.
The Pentagon revealed that only a very small fraction of denied entries warrant deeper counterintelligence follow-up. Nonetheless, the DoD has emphasized information sharing:
“We work with local, state, and federal law enforcement, the intelligence community, and our foreign partners to protect our military bases against these threats at home and abroad.” – DoD statement
This means if a foreign national is stopped, base security often immediately notifies the FBI or relevant agencies. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) have proven valuable at preventing unauthorized access to installations, integrating DoD investigators, FBI agents, DHS immigration officers, and local police. In the Key West cases, for instance, the South Florida JTTF and NCIS were instrumental in apprehending and building a case against the trespassers.
Another policy change came after a notable land-security controversy: in 2021, a Chinese company purchased land near Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. The prevalence of Chinese-owned farmland near military installations has also been cited as a security concern regarding the recent increase in unauthorized drone access of DoD sites. This led the DoD to seek new rules barring foreign ownership of real estate within 100 miles of sensitive bases.
In 2023, the DoD supported provisions enacted via the National Defense Authorization Act aimed at preventing unauthorized access to installations by giving the federal government authority to block or review land sales near military sites by entities linked to adversarial nations. This policy isn’t about trespassing per se, but it closes a potential espionage vector—adversaries establishing a physical foothold just outside a base’s fence line.
Interagency Coordination
Preventing unauthorized access to DoD installations requires seamless coordination among agencies. The DoD has updated protocols with the DHS to quickly vet the immigration and visa status of any foreign person detained at a base. In cases like the Quantico breach, CBP and ICE were contacted immediately to determine if the individuals were recent border crossers or on watchlists.
The FBI has likewise adjusted its posture—treating repeated base trespassing attempts as a counterintelligence priority rather than random misdemeanors. The Bureau’s Washington Field Office, for example, now routinely opens an investigation when multiple incidents occur at the same installation.
This means base commanders are not alone; they have direct lines to federal law enforcement and intelligence support when an unauthorized access attempt raises red flags. The creation of centralized reporting mechanisms has been key—the DoD and FBI use systems like eGuardian to log suspicious unauthorized access attempts across all installations, preventing espionage attempts by ensuring patterns like the same individual attempting entry at multiple sites or similar cover stories being used are spotted and disseminated quickly. The result is a more unified defensive posture, where military security forces, counterintelligence officers, and homeland security agents act in concert to thwart and investigate trespass attempts.
On the policy front, DoD and DOJ have also discussed updating the rules of engagement for base security personnel. Currently, lethal force is authorized if an intruder poses an imminent threat, but a fleeing trespasser who doesn’t respond to commands presents a grey area. Some have advocated clarifying guidance to empower base guards to disable vehicles or drones in certain intrusion scenarios. Likewise, there are calls to publicize the consequences: the Pentagon has considered outreach to warn that foreign “tourists” caught in off-limits areas will face prosecution or expulsion. By signaling a tougher stance and working hand-in-glove with law enforcement, the DoD is working at preventing trespassing by raising the risks for anyone contemplating unauthorized access to installations.
Best Practices and Emerging Security Technologies
Securing sprawling military installations against intruders requires a multi-layered approach. Alongside policy measures, the DoD is investing in new technologies and best practices to stay ahead of adversaries’ tactics. Senior security officials recognize that human guards and fences alone are not sufficient against determined espionage actors. Below are key innovations and practices being deployed to bolster base security:
AI-Driven Surveillance and Analytics
Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing how bases monitor their perimeters. The U.S. Army recently tested a cutting-edge AI security system at Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky—a real-time threat detection platform that integrates with existing CCTV cameras.
This AI system uses computer vision and deep neural networks to automatically detect intruders or anomalous behaviors. It can distinguish, for instance, a person climbing a fence from a wandering deer, and immediately alert security forces with a description of what the person is doing.
During tests, the system proved capable of detecting perimeter breaches from hundreds of meters away and even identifying weapons in seconds during an active shooter simulation. Jim Vaughan, Provost Marshal for the Army’s Joint Munitions Command, called the AI platform a game changer for security and protection, noting it modernizes antiquated camera systems into smart sentries.
Such AI-driven analytics provide 24/7 automated watch, reducing the burden on human operators and enabling faster response to unauthorized entry. The DoD is evaluating deploying similar AI surveillance suites to high-risk installations, which will help with preventing unauthorized access through breaching a back fence or sneaking in after dark.
Biometric and Digital Screening at Gates
Enhanced identity verification is a priority at installation entry points. Many bases have moved to biometric screening technologies to vet visitors and workers. For example, some Army facilities are experimenting with facial recognition at access control points to match faces against watchlists in real time. Biometric databases can flag people of interest by fingerprints, iris, or facial data within seconds.
If a known espionage suspect or someone with a fake ID attempts entry, the system can automatically deny access and alert authorities. The Pentagon is also rolling out scannable Defense biometrics IDs and enforcing REAL ID Act compliance for visitors’ driver’s licenses to ensure no one slips through with forged credentials.
New gate systems can read a driver’s ID, capture their facial image, and log their vehicle license plate simultaneously, running all against threat databases. This digitization of gate security both speeds up throughput and hardens the process against social engineering—a guard is less likely to wave someone through on a friendly pretense if the computer has flagged an anomaly.
In addition, bases are implementing biometric-enabled watchlists (BEWL) that compile individuals of counterintelligence concern such as prior trespassers. These watchlists are shared across installations. If an individual was caught surveilling a base in California and later tried to enter a base in Virginia, the biometric match will immediately notify security of the past incident.
Proactive Counterintelligence and OSINT
A less visible but equally important layer of defense is the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT) and counterintelligence measures to identify threats before they reach the gates. Military and intelligence agencies are increasingly combing open sources for clues of planning or suspicious interest in U.S. bases.
For example, analysts monitor social media and travel forums where foreign tourists discuss U.S. trips—looking for chatter about visiting military sites or unusual itineraries that flag a possible espionage motive. They also keep tabs on known foreign intelligence operatives or military researchers who suddenly show up at academic programs or tech companies near bases.
Through information sharing with allied intelligence and domestic agencies, DoD counterintelligence can sometimes spot and track suspected infiltrators as they move in the U.S. For instance, if a group of individuals from an adversary nation arrive on tourist visas and embark on a road trip through the American Southwest visiting national parks, and one of those parks borders a sensitive test range, red flags go up. OSINT analysis might reveal that these individuals have backgrounds in signals intelligence or mapping, based on online resumes or university websites, further pointing to espionage intent.
Armed with this data, military base security can be warned in advance to be on the lookout for specific persons or vehicles. Additionally, base security officers routinely brief local civilian law enforcement and nearby communities on what to report—for example, asking hotel workers to tip off authorities if “tourists” have extensive camera equipment and show unusual interest in base directions or tour info. This community awareness is a best practice that extends the security perimeter outward, leveraging every available sensor, human and technical, to detect reconnaissance and approach by potential intruders early.
Robotics and Unmanned Patrols
The Air Force has pioneered the use of robotic security dogs to patrol perimeters and hard-to-monitor areas. Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida was one of the first to deploy semi-autonomous quadruped robots resembling mechanical canines to augment its Security Forces Squadron.
These robots can roam the base’s outskirts with cameras and sensors, relay live video, and even issue verbal warnings to intruders. They are particularly useful for covering remote or rugged terrain where human patrols are infrequent. The robots leverage AI to detect unusual objects or persons and can alert human defenders to check a specific location. Early results show they significantly extend the eyes and ears of base security, acting as a force multiplier for installations with large footprints.
In the same vein, some bases are employing small surveillance drones to do periodic sweeps of their perimeter fence line, especially at night. An aerial vantage point can catch trespassers who might exploit blind spots at ground level. The integration of unmanned systems—ground robots and aerial drones—into base security is an emerging best practice to achieve persistent surveillance with fewer personnel.
Drone Incursions: A Related Emerging Threat
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS)—drones—represent a parallel threat vector for unauthorized access to military installations. Recent years have seen a surge in drone incursions over U.S. bases, raising additional espionage and force protection concerns.
In 2022 alone, there were 350 drone sightings over or near U.S. military sites, spanning over 100 different installations. These range from small quadcopters hovering over base perimeters to larger unmanned aircraft conducting apparent surveillance flights. Gen. Gregory Guillot, the commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, warned in early 2025 that many of these UAS incursions are likely probing sensitive facilities:
“The primary threat I see…is detection and perhaps surveillance of sensitive capabilities on our installations.” General Gregory Guillot
In other words, drones could be mapping out base layouts, detecting radar frequencies, or even capturing imagery of critical assets—all without a human trespasser stepping foot on the property.
Recent Drone Incidents
A number of mysterious drone incidents underscore the issue. In late 2023, bases in New Jersey, including Naval Weapons Station Earle and the Army’s Picatinny Arsenal, reported multiple unauthorized drones overhead. At one point, swarm-like drone activity was so concerning that Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Ohio) had to briefly close its airspace until the drones departed. In another case, security personnel at an Air Force base observed a cluster of up to six drones operating in coordination at night—suggesting a planned effort to test reactions. There have also been reports of drone flights near U.S. nuclear missile facilities in Colorado and Montana, as well as over Navy yards.
While some incursions may be innocent hobbyists or commercial drones straying, defense officials assess that many are deliberate. The pattern of activity, often occurring at bases known for R&D or high-tech units, points to state actors. U.S. counterintelligence suspects that China, among others, is behind some of these drone operations. Unlike ground intrusions, drones allow adversaries to spy with less risk—the operator might be miles away, or even in another country if the drone is autonomous or pre-programmed.
Implications of Drone Overflights
Unauthorized drones pose several risks. First, they can conduct surveillance: high-resolution cameras or signal interception payloads on a drone could capture imagery of weapons systems, flight operations, or communications emanating from a base. Such information is intelligence gold.
Second, drones present a safety hazard to military aviation. Imagine a small drone ingested into the engine of a fighter jet during takeoff—the results could be catastrophic. This is why Wright-Patterson AFB took the extreme step of halting flights when drones were reported in its airspace.
Third, there’s a potential weaponization threat. A drone could be modified to carry explosives or chemical agents and crash into a target on the base. While no such attack has occurred on U.S. soil, the military is keenly aware that non-state actors and nation-states via proxies have used drones as weapons elsewhere.
Even simple harassment by drones can disrupt base security operations and divert resources. In short, drones give adversaries a way to penetrate airspace that bypasses traditional perimeter defenses.
Counter-Drone Measures
To combat this threat, the DoD has been rapidly fielding counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies and protocols. In 2018, Congress granted the Pentagon special authority to detect and disable unauthorized drones in the vicinity of military installations, which previously was a legal gray area due to FAA regulations.
Using that authority, bases have installed detection systems—ranging from radar and radio-frequency scanners to electro-optical trackers—to get early warning of drone activity. For instance, after the spate of incursions in the Northeast, the Pentagon deployed additional C-UAS assets to the affected New Jersey bases. One of the tools now in place is the Dronebuster, a handheld electronic warfare device that jams a drone’s control signals or GPS connection. This can force the drone to descend or return to its operator.
Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder, DoD’s Press Secretary, confirmed that active and passive detection capabilities and jamming systems have been sent to bolster base defenses. These include non-kinetic measures like signal disruption and more traditional ones like net guns or high-power microwave systems that fry drone circuits. The military is also testing directed-energy weapons—lasers—in some locales that can shoot down small drones at short range.
At a national level, the Pentagon created a joint office to coordinate counter-drone efforts across services—a C-UAS task force. Gen. Guillot noted the need for a designated synchronizer and integrator for counter-drone activities within the U.S. homeland. This has led to NORTHCOM taking a larger role in unifying the response, ensuring that tactics used by an Air Force base in one state are shared with an Army depot in another.
Additionally, DoD works closely with the FAA and DHS on this issue. When drone sightings occur, bases now rapidly report them up the chain and to FAA air traffic controllers. If a drone presents a clear danger or is surveilling sensitive areas, commanders have standing authorization to take appropriate action to mitigate the threat. So far, DoD has been cautious about shooting down drones unless absolutely necessary, to avoid collateral damage. But as technology improves, we may see more aggressive neutralization of rogue drones.
Integration with Traditional Security
The link between drone incursions and physical trespassing is also being addressed. Security personnel are trained to consider that a drone might be the precursor or accompaniment to a ground intrusion—for example, a drone could distract guards or map out response routes for a later fence jumper. Conversely, if an intruder is caught, bases now check the skies for any coinciding drone activity that might indicate a coordinated effort to film the breach or relay information.
By viewing drones and ground trespassers as part of a holistic threat, the DoD’s counterintelligence enterprise ensures that information on drone incidents such as where they tend to fly and at what time of day is shared with those guarding the installations. The DoD, DHS, and FBI have even run joint exercises where a scenario includes both a physical intruder and drone support, to practice a combined response.
In prior analysis, experts have noted that these drone incursions could very well be probes by a state adversary similar to the tourist-espionage incidents. Both forms of intrusion test U.S. defenses and gather data. Thus, many recommendations for physical security—such as better surveillance and interagency coordination—apply equally to countering drones. The emerging consensus is that U.S. bases must have a comprehensive security posture that covers all domains: controlling the ground gates, the perimeter, and now the low-altitude airspace overhead. The investments in counter-drone technology, much like those in AI and biometrics, are a crucial part of that layered defense.
Conclusion
Unauthorized access attempts at DoD installations—whether by would-be intruders on foot or prying eyes in the sky—represent a real and evolving threat to U.S. national security. The past five years have shown a troubling pattern of foreign adversaries, especially the Chinese government, using seemingly innocuous means to penetrate the first line of defense at our bases. These gate crasher incidents and drone overflights underscore the need for constant vigilance and adaptation.
In response, the DoD and U.S. government at large are taking decisive action: investigating incidents, closing legal loopholes, hardening installation security, and deploying cutting-edge technologies to detect and deter infiltrators. Enhanced penalties like those proposed in the GATE CRASHERS Act aim to put adversaries on notice that trespassing near the flight line or ammo depot will no longer be a low-consequence endeavor. Meanwhile, smarter fences, cameras, AI watchers, and counter-drone systems are raising the bar for what it takes to breach a base.
For senior DoD leaders, the mandate is clear—protect the force and critical assets at home with the same intensity used abroad. This means treating a confused “tourist” at a base gate as potentially the tip of an intelligence operation, and a quadcopter hovering over the barracks as more than a mere nuisance. The best practices highlighted—from interagency intelligence fusion to robotic patrols—drive toward one goal: left of boom prevention. By spotting and stopping intrusions early, preferably before adversaries glean any useful information, the risk can be managed.
The security community should also recognize the agility of our adversaries. Just as we shore up one gap, they will search for another—perhaps using cyber intrusions like hacking a gate control system to facilitate physical ones or employing insiders to aid external trespassers. A holistic approach blending counterintelligence, physical security, and cybersecurity is therefore essential. Encouragingly, the coordination between DoD, DHS, FBI, and others has improved, as evidenced by joint responses to incidents and congressional attention galvanizing further action.
