Over 1 million Americans have died from drug overdoses since 2000, with some 70-80% of these deaths involving a fatal dose of the synthetic opioid fentanyl. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans between the ages of 18 and 45. In 2023, the U.S. government seized 77 million fentanyl pills and nearly 12,000 pounds of fentanyl powder. These record seizures represent enough to kill every American. At the heart of this crisis are precursor chemicals, almost exclusively manufactured and exported from China to the Mexican Sinaloa and Jalisco cartel organizations. China likely views this complex intersection of public health and international relations as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the U.S.
Linking Fentanyl Cooperation to Geopolitical Goals
The 15 November 2023 Woodside Summit between President Biden and President Xi resulted in a quid pro quo deal in which China would cooperate in countering the flow of precursor chemicals if the U.S. removed the Chinese Ministry of Public Security’s Institute of Forensic Science from its sanctioned entities list. The Institute of Forensic Science, which had restrictions on accessing U.S. technology due to reported involvement in human rights abuses against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, was removed from the U.S. sanctioned entities list on 17 November 2023.
After the removal of the Institute from U.S. sanctions list, the PRC government issued a 12 point notice to Chinese chemical and pharmaceutical companies to exercise caution in selling substances that can be used to make narcotics. On 30 January 2024, the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-China Counternarcotics Working Group was held in Beijing, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: U.S. and Chinese officials meet at the inaugural U.S. – China Counternarcotics Working Group in Beijing, 30 January 2024. Source: © 2024 Reuters.
The quid pro quo deal that sparked China’s renewed focus on countering narcotics enforcement suggests that China will link future cooperation with U.S. concessions on broader geopolitical objectives.
Diplomatic Leverage: China may view cooperation on the fentanyl issue as a way to gain diplomatic leverage with the U.S., particularly at times when relations are strained due to trade disputes, human rights concerns, and territorial issues in the South China Sea and Taiwan. By positioning itself as a cooperative partner in combating the fentanyl crisis, China could seek to soften criticism or gain goodwill in other contentious areas.
International Image and Soft Power: By cooperating with the U.S. to address the fentanyl crisis, China can enhance its international image as a responsible global actor committed to combating global challenges. This aligns with its desire to increase its soft power and reshape global governance norms to reflect its interest to become a dominant global leader.
Security and Law Enforcement Collaboration: Collaboration on fentanyl can also serve as a gateway for broader security and law enforcement cooperation, allowing China to address its own concerns about drug trafficking, cybercrime, and other transnational issues. This could include sharing intelligence, joint operations, or capacity-building initiatives that serve China’s domestic and international security interests.
Trade and Economic Concessions: China might link its efforts to control fentanyl precursors to negotiations on trade policies, tariffs, or access to technology and markets. It could seek concessions that support its economic interests and reduce barriers for Chinese companies.
Strategic and Security Issues: China could expect the U.S. to adopt a more accommodating stance on issues it considers vital to its national security, such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, or its border with India. This might involve expecting the U.S. to reduce its military presence in Asia or soften its support for countries that China has disputes with.
Human Rights and Governance: China may also seek a less confrontational U.S. approach to issues related to human rights, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. It could push for a reduction in public criticism, sanctions, or other measures that it views as interference in its domestic affairs.
Limitations and Challenges to Counternarcotics Cooperation
Chinese action has so far been limited to some delisting advertisements of the 153 fentanyl-related substances for which the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) lists no known legitimate use. However, hundreds of chemicals with dual uses can be repurposed to produce fentanyl. China’s continued insistence against prosecuting nonscheduled, legal chemicals represents an ongoing challenge to the bilateral U.S.-China counternarcotics relationship.
Smaller, largely unregistered China-based chemical companies and online personas have openly advertised and sold fentanyl precursor chemicals from easily accessed online platforms, such as “Made-in-China.” Recently, possibly in response to China’s renewed counternarcotics efforts, these prominent online markets stopped featuring many scheduled fentanyl precursor chemicals, as shown in Figure 2. However, dual-use chemical advertisements featuring easy and secure transportation to Mexican locations remained, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Made-in-China marketplace searches no longer yield results for scheduled fentanyl precursor chemicals like 1-Boc-4-(Phenylamino)piperidine (1-N-Boc-4-苯胺基哌啶) and 1-Boc-4-piperidon (N-叔丁氧羰基-4-哌啶酮). Source: © 2024 Made-in-China
Figure 3: Made in China marketplace features advertisements for dual-use chemicals like Propionyl chloride (丙酰氯). Source: © 2024 Made-in-China
The U.S. and China should publicly pressure chemical and pharmaceutical companies into not selling fentanyl precursors on these easily accessed online marketplaces. However, the high demand for precursor chemicals from Mexican transnational criminal organizations will inevitably result in alternative strategies and marketplaces to circumvent restrictions, at least in the medium term.
Some precursor sales advertisements have shifted from online platforms such as “Made-in-China” to more disparate, obscure channels, including non-marketplace sites and the dark web, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. This operational change will challenge efforts aimed at tracking and intercepting illicit fentanyl precursor flows.
Figure 4: A scheduled fentanyl precursor chemical advertisement mentioning special line delivery—a shipping method that can decrease chances of interdiction—on calameo.com, a French e-publishing site. Source: © 2024 calameo.com
Figure 5: A scheduled fentanyl precursor chemical advertisement on soundcloud.com, a German-based audio hosting site with precursor ads often embedded into audio files or images, possibly to avoid discovery by law enforcement authorities. Source: © 2024 soundcloud.com
Conclusion
As bad faith actors in China continue to sell fentanyl precursors in a fragmented market designed to evade increased counternarcotics efforts, innovative approaches to discover, illuminate and monitor these complex networks are needed. While fentanyl has largely been an American problem, the ease of production and high profit margins make it an attractive illicit commodity for global criminal networks. Eradicating or drastically reducing the supply chain from China necessary to produce illicit fentanyl should therefore be among the top priorities for all U.S. partner nations.
