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China’s Information Operations Strategy: Controlling Narratives and Shaping Global Perceptions

China’s Information Operations Strategy: Controlling Narratives and Shaping Global Perceptions

China's information operations strategy differs significantly from Russia's, focusing on shaping global perceptions and promoting the political and economic stability of China. Through state-controlled media, coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media, and leveraging international influencers, China seeks to amplify positive narratives and suppress critical voices. This multi-faceted approach aims to enhance China's soft power and counteract negative perceptions related to human rights and territorial disputes.

For many years, a narrative has evolved in government, industry, and academia about China’s information operations strategy. The narrative generally goes that Chinese content is less effective and of lower quality than that of Russia. This would be the case, if China’s goals were the same as Russia’s. They are not.

Russia’s goals on social media are primarily to influence both domestic and international audiences by exploiting existing social and political divisions and creating chaos through coordinated inauthentic online campaigns. This strategy aims to undermine trust in institutions and sow discord within target countries, as demonstrated by the activities of Russia’s Internet Research Agency (Zafra et al., 2022). Their domestic targets include the populace and local opposition.  Russian campaigns tend to be higher quality and demonstrate a deeper understanding of what is rhetorically persuasive to their desired audiences.

China’s information operations strategy goals are focused on shaping global perceptions of China. These efforts promote the political and economic stability of China by amplifying positive narratives about the country while suppressing and discrediting critical voices (Linvill et al., 2021; Warren et al., 2023). This strategy involves using state-controlled media, coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media, and leveraging international influencers to create an illusion of widespread support and legitimacy (Brady, 2015; King et al., 2017). By controlling the narrative, China aims to enhance its soft power and counteract negative perceptions related to issues like human rights and territorial disputes (Watts, 2020). In essence, China seeks to cultivate a positive global image while marginalizing dissenting views.

State Media and Propaganda:

The Chinese state heavily invests in state media outlets that propagate the government’s narratives. In this area, the Chinese are much like the Russians, although how they employ state media differs somewhat. Chinese usage includes disseminating information through state-controlled TV channels, newspapers, and online platforms. These outlets, such as CCTV, Xinhua News Agency, and People’s Daily, serve as the primary vehicles for disseminating the Communist Party’s messaging to both domestic and international audiences (see Figure 1). These media entities operate under strict state control and are used to promote policies, celebrate achievements, and shape perceptions in favor of the Chinese government (Brady, 2015).

China's information operations strategy includes attempting to undermine U.S. credibility by accusing it of acts the Chinese themselves employ.
Figure 1: Example of Chinese state media accusing the U.S. of employing tactics similar to those used by China’s ’50 Cent Army.’ Source: Xinhua News Agency

China also leverages international media partnerships and investments to extend its reach. For example, Chinese media outlets have established cooperative agreements with foreign news organizations, providing them with content that aligns with Beijing’s narratives. This strategy not only amplifies China’s voice but also lends it credibility through association with established media brands (Watts, 2020).

Social Media Manipulation:

The use of overt state media is supplemented by covert efforts to amplify state narratives through less obvious means. This includes the deployment of coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) on social media platforms, where fake accounts and bots are used to create an illusion of widespread support for Chinese policies and to suppress dissenting voices. These tactics are evident in campaigns such as the promotion of Xinjiang cotton, the suppression of narratives regarding Uyghur human rights abuses, and the “5-Year Spam” campaign (Linvill et al., 2021).

In the case of the Xinjiang cotton campaign, China deployed a vast network of inauthentic accounts to flood social media with positive messages about the cotton industry in Xinjiang (see Figure 2). When #GenocideGames or #XinjiangCotton became rallying points for the opposition, the Chinese government flooded these hashtags with pro-Chinese cartoons and feel-good messaging about Xinjiang. This tactic of flooding a hashtag buries the original narrative that China wanted suppressed. The quality of the content the Chinese use does not matter, just the quantity.  By saturating the conversation with favorable narratives, these accounts aimed to drown out critical voices and create an impression of widespread support for China’s policies in Xinjiang (Linvill et al., 2021).

China's information operations strategy involves promoting content designed to counter negative narratives and promote a positive spin on questionable activities.
Figure 2: Screen capture from a video prominently featured on pro-CCP media in 2022, showcasing products reportedly made by patriotic Xinjiang natives. Source: Weibo

Similarly, the 5-year Spam campaign involved sustained efforts to influence discussions on various platforms by flooding them with pro-China content, while discrediting opposition. This operation targeted not only domestic audiences but also international platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The operation used a mix of fake accounts, repurposed accounts, and bots to amplify China’s narratives and discredit opposing views (see Figure 3). This long-term campaign included targeting specific individuals (Steve Bannon, Guo Wengui, and Li Meng Yan), spreading propaganda (e.g. COVID-19 was released by the U.S. Army), and engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior online to shape public perception in favor of China (Warren et al., 2023).

China leverages hundreds of fake social media accounts to flood conversations.
Figure 3: Three fake profiles for a Dr. Li Meng Yan demonstrate China’s tactics of creating hundreds of social media accounts to flood conversations. Source: X.com

To reach its domestic audience, China’s information operations strategy includes crowd-sourcing their inauthentic online behavior and narrative control activities (see Figure 4). Many names have arisen for this tool, but the most common nomenclature is the “50 Cent Army.” China employs this group of millions of social media users to post pro-government content and drown out opposition. This term originated from the alleged pay rate of 50 Chinese cents per post. Compensation and organization vary based on types of content posted and position in the various echelons of the decentralized group. The 50 Cent Army operates primarily within China’s borders, creating an overwhelming presence on domestic social media platforms such as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. These commentators are tasked with steering public opinion in favor of the government, distracting from sensitive issues, and reporting on users who express dissent (King et al., 2017).

China uses a wide array of visuals, including comics, to promote its information operations.
Figure 4: Chinese-language Twitter comics targeting Chinese citizens and the diaspora overseas. Source: X.com

To reach international audiences, China engages in astroturfing campaigns and uses YouTube influencers to spread positive messages about China. Astroturfing involves creating the appearance of grassroots support through orchestrated efforts by groups of paid individuals or fake accounts. These campaigns are designed to make pro-China sentiments appear more widespread and organic than they are. These influencers, often with large followings, are given incentives to create content that portrays China positively. This content ranges from travel vlogs showcasing China’s landscapes and culture to more politically charged topics like defending China’s policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. By leveraging the credibility and reach of popular influencers, China can subtly influence foreign audiences without the overt branding of state media (Zeng, 2016).

These tactics are part of China’s broader information operations strategy to control the narrative and counteract negative perceptions of China. By combining state media, covert social media manipulation, and collaborations with international influencers, China aims to create a multi-layered approach to influence public opinion both domestically and internationally. The coordinated efforts ensure that China’s preferred narratives gain traction and visibility while dissenting voices are marginalized or drowned out by sheer volume. This multi-pronged strategy is evident in numerous documented campaigns, where the synchronization of state media messages, social media astroturfing, and influencer collaborations work together to shape global perceptions in favor of China (Linvill et al., 2021; Warren et al., 2023).

China will attempt to overwhelm accounts viewed as negative towards the CCP.
Figure 5: Multiple accounts spoofing Qui Jiajun in an attempt to deny him PayPal donations. Source: X.com

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References

  • Brady, A. M. (2015). Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  • King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017). How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. American Political Science Review, 111(3), 484-501.
  • Linvill, D., Warren, P., Sheffield, S., Warren, J., Brierre, B., Cole, G., Heijjer, J., Reich, T., Saunders, G., & Taylor, J. (2021). Xinjiang Nylon: The Anatomy of a Coordinated Inauthentic Influence Operation. Clemson University Media Forensics Hub. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/mfh_ci_reports/4
  • Warren, P., Linvill, D., Fecher, L., Warren, J., Sheffield, S., Taylor, J., Gubanich, A., Hundley, P., Lamont, J., Meadows, S., Rohrer, J., Sutton, M., & Easler, S. (2023). The 5-Year Spam: Tracking a Persistent Chinese Influence Operation. Clemson University Media Forensics Hub. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/mfh_ci_reports/7
  • Watts, J. (2020). Revealed: China’s network of influence in British universities. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/jan/30/revealed-china-network-of-influence-in-british-universities
  • Zafra, D. K., Serabian, R., Riddell, S., & Brubaker, N. (2022, October 24). How to understand and action Mandiant’s intelligence on information operations | mandiant | google cloud blog. Threat Intelligence. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/understand-action-intelligence-information-operations
  • Zeng, J. (2016). The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy, and Party Cohesion. Palgrave Macmillan.

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