Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in the United States (U.S.) has become a focal point of national security concern. From legal obligations that tie Chinese tech firms to Beijing’s intelligence apparatus, to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and supply chain dependencies, the presence of Chinese telecom technology on American soil raises red flags. This analysis delves into the risks and implications, including what might happen if geopolitical tensions like a Taiwan crisis sever ties and leave Chinese telecom assets stranded in the U.S. It also reviews where Chinese telecom gear is embedded in U.S. networks today, and the U.S. policies responding to the risks. Government acquisition decision-makers must understand these dynamics to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain supply chain resilience.
Table of Contents
- Chinese Telecom Giants and Obligations Under Chinese Law
- Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Espionage Risks in U.S. Networks
- Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Challenges
- Geopolitical Wildcard: A Taiwan Crisis and Chinese Telecom Assets
- Where Chinese Telecom Infrastructure Lingers in the U.S.
- U.S. Policy Response: From Bans to Strategic Decoupling
- Conclusion: Toward Resilient and Secure Telecom Supply Chains
Chinese Telecom Giants and Obligations Under Chinese Law
One foundational concern is the legal mandate Chinese companies must assist their government’s intelligence operations. Under China’s National Security Law (2015) and National Intelligence Law (2017), Chinese citizens and enterprises are required to support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence agencies. In practice, this means telecom giants like Huawei and ZTE cannot refuse a request from Beijing to share data or access if asked—they are legally beholden to serve Chinese state security interests.
Huawei insists it would never spy for China, even commissioning a legal analysis to argue it cannot be compelled, but many international experts remain unconvinced. The laws are broadly worded and largely untested in Chinese courts, leaving plenty of ambiguity that favors the state’s demands. This legal backdrop is a big reason Huawei, ZTE, and others are viewed not as ordinary private companies, but as extensions of the Chinese state.
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Espionage Risks in U.S. Networks
Allowing Chinese-designed telecom networks and hardware into U.S. infrastructure creates serious cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The most immediate fear is espionage—that routers, switches, or cell towers from Huawei/ZTE could surreptitiously siphon off sensitive data and send it to China. This is not a theoretical worry; it has precedent. In Africa, for example, investigations found that Chinese-built telecom networks were used for data extraction and spying, sending confidential data back to servers in Beijing. U.S. officials fear a similar outcome if Chinese telecoms infrastructure equipment is deeply embedded in American networks.
Case in point: recent probes have discovered Huawei equipment installed on cell towers near U.S. military bases and nuclear missile silos—a placement ripe for espionage. In 2022, the U.S. government opened an investigation into Huawei after reports that cell towers in Montana, Wyoming, and Nebraska—including those near Malmstrom Air Force Base and F.E. Warren Air Force Base, which oversee U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles—were using Huawei gear. Authorities grew concerned that these components could capture sensitive communications or radar data from the bases and transmit it back to China. An FCC commissioner noted the risk that Chinese equipment might even function as an early warning system for China, detecting U.S. military mobilizations or missile launches in real time.
Another example came from rural telecom carrier Viaero, which serves areas of Nebraska and Colorado. Around 80% of Viaero’s network equipment was sourced from Huawei as of a few years ago. Some of Viaero’s cell sites are situated near sensitive missile silo fields. U.S. security officials warned that China could use that equipment to observe when networks go online or offline, monitor secure facility status, and even track personnel movements at these strategic sites, and an FBI investigation found Chinese telecom infrastructure could intercept and disrupt DoD communications. Chinese telecom gear in proximity to critical defense installations opens a door for real-time surveillance or signals intelligence that could undermine U.S. national security.
Beyond military espionage, there are broader data privacy concerns. Telecom infrastructure carries vast amounts of American telephone calls, internet traffic, and location data. If a Chinese-made backbone switch or a cloud server is handling U.S. consumer or government data, could that data be quietly copied to China? Given Beijing’s legal pressures mentioned above, the answer isn’t reassuring. Even commercial data—for example, the web traffic of a Fortune 500 company—could be of interest to Chinese intelligence or state-backed hackers for economic espionage. The 2014-2015 hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, widely attributed to China, proved how valuable American data is to Beijing. Telecom networks are another pathway to such data.
Finally, there’s the risk of sabotage or disruption. If Chinese telecom infrastructure is deeply embedded in U.S. critical networks, from 5G cellular systems to electrical grid communications, could Beijing leverage it to cause outages or degradation during a conflict? Security experts have labeled Huawei a potential Trojan horse—a seemingly benign presence that could be activated for malicious purposes in the future. Hidden backdoors in the firmware, or undisclosed remote administration features, might allow Chinese operators to shut down or manipulate American networks at the worst possible time. While no public evidence of such a kill-switch has emerged, the very possibility is enough for caution, given what’s at stake to critical infrastructure and financial networks.
Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Challenges
From an acquisition and supply chain perspective, relying on Chinese telecom technology introduces significant SCRM challenges. Modern supply chain risk management isn’t just about cost and efficiency—it’s about ensuring the integrity, security, and resilience of every component that goes into critical infrastructure. Chinese telecom gear undermines that goal in several ways:
- Untrusted Components: Western governments worry that Chinese-made equipment may contain backdoors or hidden vulnerabilities planted during manufacturing. These could be used for spying or cyberattacks. For instance, a Huawei router could be designed to accept hidden commands or leak data packets without user knowledge. This prompted the U.S. to enact strict bans—Section 889 of the 2019 NDAA prohibits federal agencies or contractors from using Huawei, ZTE, or other covered Chinese telecom gear. Similarly, the FCC has taken actions to ban and replace such equipment from U.S. networks.
- Strategic Dependency: From a strategic view, if the U.S. or its industries become dependent on Chinese telecom suppliers, it grants Beijing potential leverage. China could threaten to withhold critical updates or parts as a bargaining chip in diplomatic disputes. We’ve seen parallels in other domains—for example, the global reliance on rare earth minerals and Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas. In the tech sphere, the U.S. Defense Department and Intelligence Community explicitly label Chinese-sourced tech as a supply chain risk, warning that China’s state-backed industrial policies seek to inject compromised technology into global supply chains. Counterfeit or subverted components such as a knock-off network chip with hidden malware also are a known problem linked to Chinese suppliers.
- Disruption of Support and Updates: Even if Chinese-made equipment functions innocuously now, future political events could cut off the supplier. Imagine a scenario where a small U.S. telecom provider’s network runs largely on Huawei equipment, as is the case for several rural carriers. If relations sour or sanctions are imposed, that provider might suddenly lose access to firmware updates, security patches, replacement components, and technical support for their network gear. Operating critical infrastructure with unsupported hardware/software is untenable—it would quickly grow vulnerable to malfunctions or cyber exploits.
U.S. government strategy has increasingly treated supply chain security as national security. The Defense Science Board now considers threats to supply chains as a new dimension of conflict, underscoring that keeping untrusted tech out is as important as traditional defense. The push for trusted suppliers has led to initiatives like the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) for defense contractors, and international efforts to coordinate on secure supply chains. All of this is aimed at reducing dependency on adversary technology—especially in communications, where the stakes are highest.
Geopolitical Wildcard: A Taiwan Crisis and Chinese Telecom Assets
Perhaps the most alarming scenario to consider is a major geopolitical rupture—for instance, if China invades Taiwan or takes decisive action in the South China Sea, it could trigger a wider conflict and heavy sanctions. In such a case, what would happen to Chinese telecom assets and infrastructure in the U.S.?
Firstly, the U.S. government would almost certainly move to seize, disable, or expel any remaining Chinese telecom presence as part of wartime security measures. A Chinese-triggered conflict would accelerate the decoupling to near-total separation overnight. We’ve partly seen this playbook with Russia: after the Ukraine invasion, Russian companies’ assets in many countries were frozen or forced out. In a China scenario, any Huawei or ZTE equipment still in U.S. networks could be ordered shut off and removed immediately.
The more problematic issue is the continuity of operations in U.S. infrastructure that had Chinese dependencies. If, say, a rural telecom provider or a power grid communications system is still running on Chinese gear at the time of a Beijing-triggered crisis, that system could be left without support or replacement parts for an extended period. Under trade embargo, no spare part shipments or vendor access would be available from China. In the worst case, if those components failed or were deliberately bricked remotely, the local service could go down until replacements are procured from elsewhere. This is how a supply chain vulnerability translates into a national security vulnerability: the U.S. could be scrambling to keep critical systems online because an adversary-made component became a single point of failure.
There’s also the risk of active cyber aggression. If a hot conflict erupts, China might launch cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure. Any known backdoors or vulnerabilities in Chinese-made equipment could be exploited as low-hanging fruit in such an attack. Security agencies predict that a Taiwan invasion would likely be accompanied by cyber offensives on U.S. power grids, communications, and other networks.
Having Chinese-built gear on those networks would be akin to leaving the front door unlocked. That gear might contain pre-planted malware or could be accessed via secret credentials, allowing Chinese state hackers to wreak havoc more easily. In wartime, every Chinese component becomes a potential enemy asset. This prospect has driven many companies to practice diversification, moving supply chains away from potential adversaries before a crisis hits.
On the flip side, consider what the Chinese government might do. If tensions reach the point of conflict, Beijing could order all Chinese firms to cut services to U.S. clients or even to sabotage their overseas equipment. A chilling scenario would be Chinese telecom engineers triggering a firmware update that brick devices in American networks. While speculative, it’s a risk U.S. planners take seriously. The mere possibility underscores why eliminating Chinese telecom infrastructure from U.S. soil before such a crisis is imperative. It’s about building resilience so that, if a geopolitical earthquake occurs, U.S. communications won’t collapse with it.
Where Chinese Telecom Infrastructure Lingers in the U.S.
Over the past decade, the U.S. has steadily purged most Chinese telecom footholds, but pockets of infrastructure and influence remain. Understanding where these are and were is important for risk management:
- Rural Carrier Networks: As mentioned, companies like Viaero serving Colorado/Nebraska and Union Wireless serving Wyoming installed Huawei equipment in the 2010s to build out their coverage. This was largely because Huawei offered inexpensive, reliable gear—a big help for rural telecom budgets. By 2018, Viaero openly noted that approximately 80% of its network equipment came from Huawei. Union Wireless similarly used Huawei core network components and radio units near its coverage area by F.E. Warren AFB. Even after the security concerns were raised, as late as mid-2022, Union’s management indicated virtually all the Huawei gear remained in its network. These rural networks are in the process of removing and replacing Chinese equipment with government subsidies, but progress has been slow.
- Former Chinese State Carrier Nodes: Up until recently, China Telecom and China Unicom—large state-owned telecom operators—had licenses to operate services in the United States. China Telecom Americas ran services here for nearly 20 years, providing international connectivity for Chinese expatriates, businesses, and even connecting calls for Chinese government facilities in the U.S. However, in 2021 the FCC revoked China Telecom’s authorization to operate in the U.S. due to national security concerns. The FCC found that China Telecom was subject to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government and could be forced to comply with espionage requests, posing significant national security and law enforcement risks. Similarly, China Unicom’s U.S. license was revoked in 2022. Today, these carriers can no longer provide telecom services inside the country. Nevertheless, one should assume that network points-of-presence and infrastructure they once operated, such as fiber routes and switching centers, might still be in place, either decommissioned or handed off to U.S. partners.
- Other Chinese Tech in Communications: While not telecom carriers per se, other Chinese technology still crops up in critical infrastructure. For example, video surveillance cameras by Chinese manufacturers Hikvision and Dahua have been widely used by U.S. schools, transit systems, and even federal facilities. These devices connect to networks and thus are part of the broader communications infrastructure. They were added to the FCC’s covered list of banned equipment in 2021 alongside Huawei. Network switches or modules made by Chinese manufacturers sometimes find their way into supply chains under white-label brands. And in the consumer space, millions of Americans own Chinese-made smartphones, such as those from OnePlus, TCL, or Huawei. While consumer devices are a slightly separate issue, they still interface with telecom infrastructure and could pose data risks if compromised.
- Expanding the Reach of Chinese Technology: Beyond conventional telecom equipment, Chinese technology is rapidly infiltrating other critical sectors. A prime example is BMW’s recent announcement to integrate Huawei’s HarmonyOS into its next-generation digital cockpits and to deploy the BMW Digital Key—based on HarmonyOS NEXT—in forthcoming models as early as 2026. This strategic move not only leverages the robust ecosystem of Chinese mobile devices, with nearly a quarter of BMW’s MyBMW users in China already on Huawei platforms, but also underscores how deeply Chinese tech is embedding itself in global products. The integration of such systems into vehicles amplifies potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities and supply chain risks, blurring the traditional lines between telecom and consumer technology infrastructures and posing fresh challenges for U.S. security policy.
Most large-scale Chinese telecom operations in the U.S. have been shut down or constrained in recent years. What remains are mostly remnants—hardware installed in earlier years that’s awaiting removal—or niche use cases. Mapping these out and addressing them is a work in progress for U.S. regulators. The FCC’s Rip and Replace program, funded by Congress, is providing nearly $2 billion to help rural carriers swap out Huawei/ZTE equipment. Yet as of mid-2023, carriers had only received about 40% of the funds requested and pleaded for more time. This indicates some Chinese gear may stay operational longer than hoped, simply due to budget and logistical hurdles. Each of those instances is a known risk window that needs closing.
U.S. Policy Response: From Bans to Strategic Decoupling
The U.S. government, across multiple administrations, has taken an increasingly hard line against Chinese telecommunications threats. Key policies and actions include:
- Banning Chinese Equipment in Federal Networks: Starting in 2018 and solidified in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, any use of Huawei, ZTE, or other listed Chinese telecom gear by U.S. federal agencies or contractors was outlawed. Section 889 of NDAA 2019 gave teeth to this by barring agencies from procuring or even contracting with companies that use such equipment, even indirectly. This forced government suppliers to excise Chinese tech from their own systems or lose federal business.
- Entity List and Export Controls: In May 2019, the Trump Administration’s Commerce Department added Huawei to the Entity List, effectively cutting off these companies from U.S. components and technology. U.S. chipmakers and software firms could no longer export to Huawei without a license, crippling Huawei’s ability to design chips and update software for its equipment. These controls aimed to blunt Huawei’s technological edge and prevent it from embedding in 5G networks globally.
- Executive Orders on Telecom Security: Also in 2019, President Trump signed an Executive Order declaring a national emergency over threats to telecom infrastructure. It empowered the government to block transactions involving communications tech from foreign adversaries. Though not named explicitly, this was directed at Chinese firms. The Biden Administration later implemented rules under this order to investigate and prohibit specific transactions—the Huawei cell tower probe in 2021 was one such action.
- FCC’s Covered List and Equipment Ban: The Federal Communications Commission has been instrumental. In March 2021, the FCC officially named five Chinese companies—Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua—to its Covered List of communications equipment posing a national security threat. Following the bipartisan Secure Equipment Act of 2021, the FCC adopted rules in late 2022 to ban all new sales, imports, or licenses of equipment from those companies in the U.S. This means Huawei and ZTE cannot get any new gear certified for U.S. use, effectively freezing them out of future networks. As FCC Chair Jessica Rosenworcel stated, the goal is to ensure untrustworthy communications equipment is not authorized for use within our borders.
- Rip and Replace Program: Recent updates have reinvigorated the FCC’s efforts to purge Chinese telecom equipment from U.S. networks. Initially established with roughly $2 billion in funding, the program received over $5 billion in reimbursement requests—forcing carriers to accept prorated payouts and extended deadlines into 2023-2024. However, a defense policy bill, signed into law on 23 December 2024, now enables the FCC to borrow an extra $3.08 billion from the Treasury—funds to be repaid via an upcoming AWS-3 spectrum auction. This additional cash flow is set to fully reimburse providers, with the program’s reimbursement portal continuing to accept invoices beyond initial allocations. At least 36 of 126 participants have completed their equipment replacements, though 132 project extensions have been granted due partly to funding gaps, supply chain disruptions, and labor shortages.
- Diplomatic Pressure and Alliances: The U.S. hasn’t acted alone. During the first Trump Administration (2017–2021), an international campaign was launched to prevent Huawei from dominating global 5G networks. The State Department’s Clean Network initiative rallied allies to pledge to exclude Chinese telecom vendors from 5G and cloud infrastructure. Countries like Australia, Japan, the U.K., and others aligned with the U.S., limiting Huawei’s global reach. This not only protects U.S. communications with those allies, keeping shared data on trusted networks, but also reduces supply chain entanglement with China. More recently, groups like the Quad have cooperation focused on secure telecom supply chains.
Looking ahead, the posture of the U.S. government is one of continued vigilance and tightening of the screws. By 2025, this effort shows no sign of abating—if anything, it’s ramping up. The 2025 Trump Administration has indicated it will double down on prior efforts to remove Chinese telecom infrastructure from the United States and push allies to do the same. This includes not just maintaining bans on Huawei and ZTE, but potentially expanding scrutiny to other Chinese tech sectors, such as restrictions on Chinese cloud providers or smartphone apps like TikTok. We may see new measures requiring government review of any telecom supply deals that involve China, much like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) reviews acquisitions. In Congress, there’s bipartisan momentum to legislate even stronger supply chain safeguards and provide more funding to replace suspect equipment. The message is clear: trusted, secure, and resilient telecom infrastructure is a national priority, and China’s state-linked tech has no role in it.
Conclusion: Toward Resilient and Secure Telecom Supply Chains
The saga of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in the U.S. highlights a classic security dilemma of the 21st century: how to balance globalization and cost-efficiency with national security and digital sovereignty. Chinese companies offered attractive technology—affordable 5G gear, help bridging the rural digital divide—but under conditions that Americans ultimately found too risky. The obligations of Chinese firms to their government, the evidence of past espionage, the potential for cyber sabotage, and the precarious supply chain dependency all add up to a threat that could not be ignored. U.S. decision-makers in government and industry have responded by drawing a firm line to exclude these risks, even at significant upfront cost.
For acquisition officials and industry leaders, the key takeaways are: know your supply chain, audit your vendors, and prepare for geopolitically-driven disruptions. Supply chain risk management is not just a compliance box to tick but a strategic practice. What if the vendor of your critical system suddenly becomes unavailable or untrustworthy? The time to mitigate that is now, not when a crisis hits. As seen with Huawei in telecom, entire networks may need overhaul when a supplier is deemed unsafe—a painful but sometimes necessary step to protect national interests.
It’s also clear that technology competition between the U.S. and China will continue. Telecom is one frontline, with 5G/6G and beyond, but there are others, such as semiconductors, AI, cloud computing. The digital iron curtain some have warned of could solidify, where there’s a Chinese tech ecosystem and a Western tech ecosystem with minimal interchange. U.S. policy seems aimed at pushing that outcome in a way that favors Western security—ensuring that even if Chinese tech advances, it doesn’t gain a controlling foothold in the U.S. or allied infrastructure.
Maintaining leadership in secure telecom requires not just saying no to high-risk vendors, but offering alternatives. U.S. and partner nations are investing in homegrown capabilities like Open RAN networks and domestic chip fabrication via the CHIPS Act to fill the gap. The goal is a diverse, competitive supply market of trusted vendors so that no adversary has leverage over our communications. In the interim, organizations must remain vigilant. Continuous monitoring, information sharing, and expert analysis are vital.
Chinese telecom infrastructure in the U.S. presents multifaceted risks—to national security, economic security, and supply chain stability. The U.S. has recognized these and is taking decisive action to mitigate them. By understanding the dangers from legal trapdoors to espionage case studies and staying proactive in risk management, government and industry leaders can protect America’s critical communications. The challenge is ongoing, but the imperative is clear: a secure and resilient network backbone is non-negotiable in today’s high-tech geopolitical environment. Every antenna, server, and switch must be vetted, because in telecommunications, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
