Chinese telecommunications infrastructure has rapidly spread across Europe over the past decade, bringing both cutting-edge connectivity and serious security concerns. From 5G wireless networks to undersea internet cables, and from massive data centers to smart city surveillance systems, Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE are deeply involved in Europe’s digital backbone. This pervasive presence of Chinese telecom equipment and investments offers economic benefits—faster networks, lower costs, and technological innovation—but it also creates potential channels for espionage, sabotage, and coercion.
European officials and allied security experts have grown increasingly alarmed that Beijing could exploit these systems to spy on communications, disrupt critical services, or divide Western alliances. Real-world incidents have heightened these fears: for example, a leaked report revealed that Huawei equipment was able to monitor all calls on a Dutch mobile network, including the prime minister’s conversations. Such cases underscore the strategic risk of relying on Chinese infrastructure in domains as sensitive as telecommunications.
Senior leaders in the U.S. Department of Defense and Intelligence Community are now grappling with the implications of China’s telecom footprint in Europe. How do Chinese-built networks and data systems potentially expose NATO allies to surveillance or cyber sabotage? What are the geopolitical ramifications of China gaining a technological stronghold in Europe, and how might that influence transatlantic security cohesion? And most importantly, what policy strategies can the U.S. and European partners pursue to mitigate the risks?
Table of Contents
- Chinese Telecom Footprint in Europe
- Technical Security Risks and Vulnerabilities
- Geopolitical Implications
- Approaches to Responding to Chinese Telecommunications Infrastructure in Europe
- A Turning Point for Digital Sovereignty
Chinese Telecom Footprint in Europe
Chinese technology giants have established a significant footprint in Europe’s telecommunications sector, supplying hardware, software, and financing across the continent’s network infrastructure. This footprint spans multiple domains.
5G Networks and Mobile Infrastructure
The most high-profile Chinese presence is in Europe’s 5G mobile networks. Huawei and ZTE—China’s leading telecom equipment vendors—have been major suppliers of the antennas, base stations, and switches that power wireless networks across Europe. In the early rollout of 5G, Huawei became a dominant vendor in many European countries, outcompeting Western rivals on cost and speed of deployment. By 2019, Huawei was involved in 5G build-outs in numerous EU states, from major economies like Germany and Italy to smaller markets. For example, by 2020 Huawei had an over 60% share of Germany’s Deutsche Telekom, and Belgium’s telecom infrastructure previously was almost entirely dependent on Chinese technology. Countries such as Hungary and Spain adopted Huawei 5G early, making future replacement costly, while others like Ireland, Serbia, and Switzerland have welcomed Chinese 5G technology.
Chinese firms often offered attractive financing and quick deployment, which appealed to telecommunications infrastructure operators across Europe. However, this widespread adoption means that today a considerable share of Europe’s mobile traffic traverses Chinese-made gear. Roughly a quarter of European mobile network equipment is from Chinese vendors, down from even higher levels a few years ago. Europe’s 5G networks, the digital nervous system of modern economies, thus have significant Chinese involvement. This has raised alarms because control over 5G infrastructure could allow an outside power to intercept data or disrupt communications on a massive scale. Some European governments have begun to restrict Huawei and ZTE in 5G, but responses vary widely by country—as of 2024, only 11 of 27 EU members had legally moved to limit or ban high-risk Chinese vendors, leaving a patchwork of security postures across the continent.
In Poland, the integration of Chinese telecoms technology remains active despite broader regional pushback. In early 2023, Spanish tower operator Cellnex deployed Huawei’s Long-Reach E-band (LR E-band) microwave backhaul at commercial sites across Poland—the first large-scale use of this Huawei technology in Europe. The company reported improvements in link distance, service stability, and capacity, showcasing why Huawei remains appealing to operators despite national security concerns. Poland has publicly aligned with the U.S. on 5G security principles and even arrested a Huawei executive in 2019 for alleged espionage, but this deployment underscores how operational imperatives can still override strategic caution, leaving critical infrastructure tethered to high-risk vendors.
Undersea Cables and Backbone Networks
Beyond wireless networks, Chinese companies have also invested in Europe’s physical internet backbone, including undersea fiber-optic cables that carry data between countries and continents. Huawei Marine, now rebranded as HMN Tech, has helped lay, upgrade, or repair approximately a quarter of the world’s submarine cables (nearly 100), including links touching Europe. One prominent example is the Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) cable, a high-speed undersea cable funded in part by Chinese interests, connecting Europe to Asia and Africa. Chinese firms’ growing role in undersea cable construction is backed by Beijing’s Digital Silk Road initiative and state subsidies.
Within Europe, undersea cables are critical infrastructure – they carry ~99% of international data traffic, supporting everything from financial transactions to military communications. Chinese involvement in these cable projects has prompted worries that vulnerabilities or monitoring capabilities could be inserted during construction or maintenance. In addition, China’s role in construction positions it to easily sabotage these cables.
Such fears no longer seem theoretical: in late 2024, two key undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea were mysteriously severed, causing internet outages. Investigators identified a Chinese-flagged ship as a prime suspect in what Germany’s defense minister called acts of sabotage. The incident underscored that undersea cables are strategic choke points. Europe is now moving to tighten security for submarine networks; in 2024, the U.S. and EU were developing a joint initiative to exclude Chinese vendors from future undersea cable laying projects. This highlights the strategic sensitivity of who builds and services Europe’s data highways under the oceans.
Data Centers and Cloud Services
Another facet of China’s telecom footprint is investment in data centers and cloud infrastructure on European soil. Chinese tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent operate cloud computing services globally, and in recent years they have opened large data centers in Europe to serve local customers. For instance, Alibaba Cloud now has multiple data centers in Germany, the UK, and elsewhere in Europe. Huawei has also established European cloud data centers and marketing its cloud solutions to industries and even government clients. These facilities store vast amounts of data and host critical applications. While they boost digital services and competition, they also mean that European data could reside in servers controlled by Chinese firms, which by law must comply with Chinese government requests.
There have been notable cases of Chinese firms investing in European data infrastructure companies as well. A striking example was Global Switch, a London-based data center operator with facilities across Europe: by 2018, a consortium led by a Chinese company acquired a controlling stake in Global Switch, prompting security concerns in the UK and other countries. The acquisition prompted Australia to move its government data out of Global Switch’s centers due to the Chinese ownership. The fear is that Chinese state agencies could compel these companies to hand over sensitive data or compromise systems. U.S. authorities have launched national security reviews of Alibaba’s cloud unit on similar grounds. For Europe, reliance on Chinese cloud providers or data center owners raises questions about data sovereignty and the privacy and security of everything from corporate trade secrets to citizens’ personal information.
Smart Cities and Surveillance Systems
Chinese telecom involvement extends into Europe’s city infrastructure as well, through smart city and surveillance technology projects. Huawei, for example, has marketed smart city solutions—integrated networks of cameras, sensors, and communications for urban security—to municipalities worldwide. In Europe, some local authorities have embraced Chinese telecommunications infrastructure offerings.
One notable case is Belgrade, Serbia, which in 2019 partnered with Huawei to install a sprawling network of facial recognition cameras as part of a Safe City project. This made Belgrade one of the first cities in Europe to be blanketed with Chinese-made surveillance tech, sparking privacy and influence concerns both locally and in the EU.
Within Germany, Gelsenkirchen, Duisburg, Hamburg, Russelsheim am Main, Kelsterbach, and Raunheim had smart city projects in 2020 with Huawei and ZTE, integrating thousands of cameras and IoT devices. Chinese companies have also donated or sold smart city equipment to cities in places like Italy and Spain in recent years as part of tech cooperation agreements.
While these projects promise smarter governance and safer cities, they also effectively embed Chinese hardware and software into the urban infrastructure that manages public data, CCTV feeds, and even law enforcement communications. This raises obvious security questions: Could the data collected—videos, license plates, facial recognition logs—be siphoned off to Chinese servers? Could the systems be accessed or controlled remotely by their vendors?
Technical Security Risks and Vulnerabilities
The integration of Chinese telecommunications equipment into Europe’s critical networks introduces a host of technical security risks. At the core of Western intelligence agencies’ concern is the possibility that Chinese-made systems come with hidden backdoors or can be covertly accessed by Beijing, enabling espionage on communications or even remote sabotage of infrastructure. These fears are not merely speculative—several pieces of evidence and incidents underscore the reality of the threat:
- Backdoors and Vulnerabilities: Security tests on Chinese telecom devices have repeatedly found weaknesses. NATO analysts note that Chinese electronic equipment often has undocumented backdoors that can funnel data directly to China. In other words, a Huawei router or switch in a European network could potentially be programmed to copy sensitive data to a server accessible by Chinese intelligence.
- Chinese Law and State Leverage: Unlike in liberal democracies, Chinese companies are legally obliged to cooperate with their state security services. China’s National Intelligence Law (2017) requires any Chinese entity to assist in intelligence work if asked. This means that a firm like Huawei or Alibaba, even when operating abroad, could be compelled to hand over data or provide network access to Chinese government agencies. No Chinese telecom vendor can ever be truly independent of the Chinese state’s demands.
- Documented Espionage Incidents: Over the past few years, concrete cases of Chinese telecom espionage in Europe have come to light. A striking example was the revelation in the Netherlands that Huawei had the technical capability to eavesdrop on all communications on KPN’s mobile network without the carrier’s knowledge. A confidential audit in 2010 found Huawei could access calls—even those being lawfully tapped by Dutch authorities—raising the specter that the Chinese government could spy on European officials and citizens. In Poland in 2019, authorities arrested a Huawei executive and a former Polish cyber security officer on charges of spying for China, indicating they had used Huawei’s access to sensitive systems for espionage. These incidents underscore that Chinese telecom firms and their employees have engaged in intelligence operations on European soil, leveraging their technological foothold.
- Critical Infrastructure “Kill Switch”: Beyond spying, there is the risk of sabotage or disruption. If a hostile actor can access network control systems, they might potentially shut down parts of the telecom network or degrade services during a crisis. For instance, if tensions spiked, China could theoretically instruct its companies to disable network components or push malicious updates, causing outages in countries heavily reliant on their gear. European security experts worry about this worst-case scenario: a hidden kill switch that could plunge cities into digital darkness or disrupt military communications. The Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in 2022 was a wake-up call about physical infrastructure; similarly, a digital sabotage via telecom networks is a scenario NATO is now actively gaming out.
- Supply Chain and Update Risks: Even if Chinese equipment is initially delivered clean, with no backdoors, maintaining it means trusting continuous software updates and technical support from the vendor. Those updates could introduce new code at any time. The highly specialized nature of 5G gear also means European operators often rely on Chinese engineers for troubleshooting. This dependence is a security risk in itself—it’s an open channel for potential compromise if relations deteriorate. Unlike open-source or Western systems, the closed, proprietary nature of Chinese telecom gear makes independent verification difficult. European labs, like the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, have found numerous software engineering flaws in Huawei equipment over the years, some so severe that they said they had only limited assurance that risks can be mitigated.
Chinese telecommunications equipment in Europe carries a latent risk: it could be the eyes and ears of an authoritarian state or a sleeper agent in critical infrastructure. These technical vulnerabilities could manifest as espionage—data interception, metadata collection, surveillance via smart city systems—or as sabotage—network outages, sabotage of undersea cables, manipulation of data flows. These threats are not abstract—the Netherlands and Poland cases, as well as incidents in Africa, show it has likely happened.
Geopolitical Implications
The expansive role of Chinese equipment in Europe’s telecommunications infrastructure is not just a technical issue—it is a geopolitical and strategic challenge with far-reaching implications for European sovereignty and transatlantic security. Several key geopolitical concerns arise from Europe’s telecom entanglement with Beijing.
Alliance Vulnerabilities and Intelligence Sharing
The presence of Chinese equipment in allied communications networks threatens to erode trust within NATO and the intelligence community. U.S. officials have repeatedly worried that sensitive intelligence or military data shared with a European ally could be exposed if that ally’s networks run on Chinese gear. This has led to past warnings that the U.S. might restrict intelligence sharing with countries that widely adopt Huawei 5G.
Such rifts began to surface when the UK initially allowed Huawei a role in its 5G—American leaders signaled it could impact the special UK-US intel relationship, contributing to Britain’s reversal and eventual ban on Huawei.
NATO as an alliance is also grappling with this: for collective defense to work, secure communication links among allies are paramount. If some allies have potentially compromised systems, it creates a weakest-link problem. NATO only recently addressed 5G security due to the diverging views within the alliance. Countries like Hungary, which has embraced Chinese 5G, and Serbia, which uses Huawei Safe City tech, raise concerns in Brussels and Washington about Chinese digital influence reaching inside Alliance networks.
Economic Leverage and Coercion
Europe’s reliance on Chinese telecom suppliers also creates economic leverage that China can exploit for political ends. Beijing has shown it is willing to punish countries economically over political disagreements—and the telecom sector is no exception. In 2020, as European nations debated banning Huawei, China explicitly threatened retaliation. Reports emerged that China would retaliate against Europe’s 5G vendors—Nokia and Ericsson—if the EU banned Huawei. This kind of pressure can make smaller European states think twice before taking action, especially those for whom Chinese trade or investment is crucial.
Moreover, countries that have become dependent on cheap Chinese telecom gear may fear that kicking out Huawei could incur Beijing’s wrath in other domains, such as reduced market access for their exporters, or less enthusiasm in Chinese investments. The result is a form of strategic dependence: China gains political influence in Europe proportional to European dependence on its technology. We have seen Hungary and other nations consistently support China’s stance in EU deliberations—possibly influenced in part by their close telecom ties and Chinese investments. This dynamic undermines European unity on foreign policy by giving China leverage over certain member states.
Influence on European Policy and Values
The spread of Chinese digital infrastructure also comes bundled with Chinese standards and norms. For instance, smart city surveillance systems reflecting China’s domestic approach to state security could normalize mass surveillance practices that clash with European privacy values. Beijing also uses its tech footprint to cultivate political relationships—Chinese telecom firms sponsor conferences, fund research, and engage former officials in Europe. Over time, this can translate to soft power and influence over regulatory decisions. A tangible example is how hard China has lobbied within Europe against any blanket ban on Huawei, emphasizing the economic costs of exclusion. In response, the EU took a compromise approach—the 5G toolbox guidelines—rather than an outright ban. Still, the influence battle is ongoing: European institutions are increasingly framing dependence on Chinese tech as a strategic liability that undermines technological sovereignty. China’s involvement complicates Europe’s pursuit of autonomy; it forces Europe to balance economic benefits against security—a balancing act China tries to tip in its favor through diplomatic and economic means.
East-West Strategic Competition
On a grander scale, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in Europe reflects and accelerates the global strategic competition between China and the West. If China controls significant swathes of Europe’s digital infrastructure, it gains a strategic foothold in the U.S.-Europe sphere. This can constrain Western options. For example, in any future crisis involving China, such as the South China Sea or Taiwan, Beijing could remind Europe of its dependence on Chinese tech to discourage European sanctions or support for the U.S.
Already, China’s integration with Europe’s economy has muted some European responses to China’s human rights issues or aggressive moves—telecom is one of the layers of dependency. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept on China explicitly recognized that Beijing’s policies pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security. Alliance leaders noted that dangerous dependencies on Chinese investments in allied critical infrastructure needed to be addressed. Every 5G base station or fiber-optic cable provided by a Chinese firm in Europe also has a geopolitical dimension: it is a thread in the complex web of influence that China is weaving across Eurasia as part of its vision for a Digital Silk Road linking China to the world.
Divergent National Approaches in Europe
The Chinese telecom issue has at times exposed divisions among European countries and between Europe and the United States. U.S. policy has long taken a hard line, pushing for a clean 5G network, urging allies to keep Huawei and China out of their telecommunications infrastructure. Some European governments like Poland, Romania, and Sweden aligned with this view, either through bans or strict laws excluding Chinese vendors from 5G. Others, like Germany and Italy, initially tried a middle path: tighter security screening but no outright ban. France chose to quietly phase out Huawei by denying renewals of licenses beyond 2028, without public fanfare; however, France was also allowing the construction of a Huawei factory in Alsace.
These differing stances create friction and allows China to exploit a divide-and-conquer strategy—rewarding or reassuring friendly states, such as promising to build chip plants in countries amid debate, while warning the more hawkish ones. However, as evidence of risks has mounted, more countries have shifted towards caution. By 2024, the European Commission warned members to enforce the toolbox or face potential action.
China’s telecom push has forced Europe into a strategic debate about how to balance security and economic ties with Beijing. That debate is ongoing, but there is now greater cohesion than a few years ago, largely due to pressure from the U.S. and revelations of Chinese capabilities. NATO and the EU are beginning to work in tandem on this, with NATO focusing on setting security expectations for allies and the EU using regulations such as investment screening and cybersecurity rules to reduce high-risk dependencies.
Approaches to Responding to Chinese Telecommunications Infrastructure in Europe
Confronted with the risks posed by Chinese infiltration, the United States and Europe are actively formulating strategies to secure their telecommunications infrastructure without derailing technological progress. A mix of defensive measures and proactive initiatives can mitigate espionage risks, protect critical systems, and reduce strategic dependencies on China.
- Strengthen Security Standards and Vetting: Europe could uniformly implement strict security benchmarks for telecom equipment. The EU’s 5G Security Toolbox guidelines are a good start, but remain non-binding and are inconsistently applied. If allies pushed to make these standards mandatory with rigorous vetting, testing, and certification of all hardware and software network components in critical infrastructure, it could prevent China from exploiting weaker rules in one country to infiltrate another. Independent labs could verify that equipment has no backdoors or unexplained beaconing of data, and any vendor—Chinese or otherwise—that fails to meet this bar should be excluded. National cybersecurity agencies and EU bodies like ENISA also could perform continuous audits on deployed gear to ensure compliance.
- Diversify Suppliers and Invest in Alternatives: Reducing reliance on Chinese vendors means diversifying the supply chain for telecom equipment. Joint support from the U.S. and EU for alternative suppliers from trusted countries—for 5G/6G this includes firms like Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung—can reduce reliance on a monopoly from one provider or country that can be leveraged by current or future adversaries. Incentives and financing for telecoms operators through subsidies and tax credits, combined with investments in open architecture technologies, can create a modular, interoperable network for allies to mix and match from different trusted sources while enhancing security and resilience.
- Phase Out High-Risk Gear with Support: For countries already deep into Chinese equipment, a gradual phase-out plan is critical. For instance, many European carriers still have Huawei components in 4G networks that interface with 5G. Governments mandates for the replacement of high-risk gear by a reasonable deadline, such as the UK’s 2027 timeline for Huawei removal, can ease the transition. Allies can establish funding mechanisms—akin to the U.S. FCC’s rip and replace fund—to financially assist telecom operators in swapping out Chinese equipment. While such upgrades cost money, expenses can be managed through alignment with normal upgrade cycles.
- Protect Critical Infrastructure—Cables & Data Centers: Recognizing undersea cables and data centers as strategic assets, allies could put in place greater protective measures. This includes monitoring and control over who builds and services undersea cables that land in Europe. Western governments could favor consortia of trusted companies for new cable projects and consider excluding Chinese firms from sensitive cable routes. Existing cables that Chinese firms helped build in Europe could require extra security audits to check for any tapping devices or encryption vulnerabilities in telecommunications infrastructure. NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell can facilitate intelligence-sharing on undersea threats and coordinate rapid response to outages. For data centers, countries could apply foreign investment screening rigorously—any Chinese acquisition of critical data infrastructure should trigger a national security review. Government and military data should be kept out of facilities owned by high-risk entities. Some allies have already moved sensitive workloads to domestically owned clouds—this trend should continue under a zero-trust assumption towards Chinese-run clouds.
A Turning Point for Digital Sovereignty
China’s extensive involvement in the telecommunications infrastructure and networks across Europe presents a complex dual reality. On one hand, it has accelerated digital development and connectivity across Europe; on the other, it has introduced serious vulnerabilities and strategic dependencies that adversaries could exploit. Nations are increasingly awake to the national security dimensions of 5G towers, fiber-optic cables, and data centers. In response, they are beginning to recalibrate policy—striving to strike the right balance between engagement and security. This means welcoming innovation and investment but not at the expense of oversight and control over critical infrastructure.
For senior defense and intelligence leaders, the task ahead is to ensure that the world’s push for technological advancement does not outpace its security safeguards. This requires vigilance: continuously assessing emerging technologies like 6G and cloud computing platforms for new risks and learning from each other’s experiences. It also requires unity: a fragmented approach only benefits Beijing’s divide-and-influence tactics. By coordinating strategies, sharing information, and standing firm on core security principles, nations can reduce their exposure to espionage and coercion while still reaping the benefits of a globalized tech ecosystem.
In the coming years, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in Europe will remain a focal point of strategic competition. How Europe manages this challenge will set a precedent for other critical sectors and for relations with China more broadly. Ultimately, protecting allied communications and data is about protecting the democratic institutions, economies, and alliances that depend on them. Through prudent risk management and forward-looking policy, Europe and its partners can ensure that their networks stay open, secure, and resilient—immune to backdoors and leverage, and guarded for the free flow of information that underpins our societies.
