Houthi Smuggling Networks: From China to Yemen via Oman

OMEN, China, Persistent Monitoring, Partner Nations

From China to Yemen: The Houthis’ Resilient Supply Lines Run Through Oman

Houthi smuggling networks are adapting under pressure, using Oman as a key transit hub for weapons and dual-use tech from China. With escalating threats to global trade and security, disrupting these supply lines is critical to countering Houthi influence in the region.

Houthi smuggling networks have proven highly resilient despite sustained military pressure from the U.S. led 34 nation Combined Maritime Force (CMF), enabling the group to maintain weapons supplies and sustain attacks in the region. These networks operate through a mix of maritime and overland routes, with Oman emerging as a critical transit hub for weapons and dual-use technologies sourced from China and Iranian-backed entities. The ability of the Houthis to adapt their supply chains has direct implications for regional stability, particularly in the Suez Canal and Bab el Mandeb, where their activities threaten global trade and security. Understanding and disrupting these smuggling operations is vital to countering the Houthis’ expanding role within the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”

The Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal and Bab el Mandeb

At a minimum, the Houthis’ have demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the mutual defense of other “Axis of Resistance” members, with little fear of the resulting kinetic response from the CMF or Israel. The Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” is primarily comprised of Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Houthis’ recent operations have had extensive ramifications, especially their anti-shipping attacks near the Suez Canal, a vital maritime corridor through which approximately 15% of global trade and up to 30% of cargo bound for U.S. east-coast ports passes. These attacks, which significantly intensified following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, are part of the Houthis’ broader strategy to leverage the Gaza crisis and further elevate their status within the Axis. The Bab el Mandeb strait, a narrow 20-mile-wide chokepoint, has become a critical focus for these operations. The strait’s narrowness allows for effective monitoring by ground radar, small boats, UAVs, and observers with long range optics, making it a strategic location for disrupting global shipping.

Houthi smuggling networks extend beyond their immediate area of control. — Figure 1: Area of Houthi control over Yemen and contested areas

The Houthis’ aggressive actions, including being the first Axis member to fire on and eventually, successfully hit a target in Israel, demonstrates their capability to conduct long range strikes, even in the face of persistent CMF airstrikes. These attacks have not only disrupted international trade but have also demonstrated the Houthis’ ability to globalize the regional conflict, positioning themselves as a potential center of gravity within the Axis.

Houthi Smuggling Networks Shift to Overland Routes via Oman

Due to intensified surveillance and interdiction along maritime routes from the CMF, the airports in Houthi-held areas being closed for all but limited humanitarian assistance, and a heavily militarized land border between Yemen and Saudi Arabi, the only border which is open for the travel of Yemeni citizens is with Oman. Along that border, only two official crossing points exist. The Shahan land port (17.7993, 52.5467) is the only crossing open to commercial trucks, and to reach this area from Houthi-controlled territory, they must travel for hundreds of miles along roads controlled by security forces of the internationally recognized government. However, several seizures along the Yemen/Oman border indicate that Houthi smuggling networks transport weapons and other military equipment across the border.

Overland smuggling routes through Oman’s Dhofar border region and into the Mahra governate in Yemen are characterized by rugged terrain and porous borders, affording a relatively unmonitored passage for transporting weapons, dual-use technologies, and other critical supplies into Yemen. The Dhofar region, including the official border crossing, is far less regulated than the coastal Sarfait border crossing. Smugglers exploit these crossings by bribing local officials or using illicit pathways to move weapons and equipment into Yemen. Goods not smuggled through the border checkpoint are typically transported by land in convoys or small vehicles that can navigate the difficult off-road terrain.

The most significant seizure occurred in March 2022, when Yemeni customs officers inspected a truck coming from the Al Mazyuhah Free Trade Zone in Oman. Concealed inside of four large fake electric generators, which were purpose-built for smuggling, were 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles which were detected when the truck was x-rayed.
On 28 October 2023, the police in Al-Mahra caught a shipment coming from the United Arab Emirates, which included twenty drone jamming devices and approximately 1,660 Redmi phones smuggled from India.
On 23 January 2024, Yemeni customs intercepted a truck entering Yemen from Oman through the Shahan border crossing. The illicit shipment contained 100 Chinese made DLE 170 UAV engines intended for the Samad-3 attack UAVs, which are a key component of the Houthis’ aerial capabilities. And on 19 July 2024, a modified Samad-3 UAV the Houthis call the “Yafa” flew 16 hours from Yemen over a distance of more than 2,600 kilometers to strike an apartment building less than two blocks from the U.S. Consulate in Tel Aviv (see Figure 2).

Houthi smuggling networks acquire Chinese engine components for use in their drones. — Figure 2: DLE engine used in Samad-3 UAVs and modified “Yafa” variant as advertised in Houthi propaganda

The Houthis likely named the UAV “Yafa” as a symbolic gesture, referring to the ancient city of Jaffa, which is part of modern-day Tel Aviv-Yafo in Israel. By naming it “Yafa,” the Houthis likely intended to evoke a connection to this historic city, symbolizing their ability to reach and strike within Israel.

Chinese Involvement in Houthi Smuggling Networks Through Dual-Use Technologies

Chinese companies have played a lesser-known but significant role in sustaining Houthi smuggling networks, providing them with dual-use technologies and components essential for their weapons programs. This involvement is notable, as it highlights the complicated, international scope of the Houthis’ supply chains.

Recent reporting, for example, indicates Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī) have assisted the Houthis in facilitating the transfer of Chinese components through Iraq, which are then transferred to Yemen via Oman. Iraqi officials confirmed in July 2024 that the Houthis established an office in Baghdad’s Al-Jadriya district. This move is part of their strategy to expand influence and likely improves their ability to procure Chinese components and Iranian weaponry. The office is not officially recognized as a diplomatic mission but serves as a hub for Houthi activities in Iraq. These components, sourced from Chinese suppliers, are required for the production of the Houthis’ UAVs and missiles, among other equipment.

In response, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned several Chinese entities in June and July 2024 for their involvement in providing material support to the Houthi rebels.

Key Chinese Entities Involved:

This company has been implicated in supplying machine components for manufacturing UAVs, including the Samad-3 model. This company has two primary shareholders, and shipping records indicate two primary buyers, one in Vietnam and one in the Philippines, illustrating the layered transshipment techniques used to move products to the Houthis in Yemen, as there are no declared shipments to Oman or Yemen.

Ningbo Beilun Saige Machine Co., Ltd. (宁波北仑赛格机械有限公司):
- This company has been implicated in supplying machine components for manufacturing UAVs, including the Samad-3 model. This company has two primary shareholders, and shipping records indicate two primary buyers, one in Vietnam and one in the Philippines, illustrating the layered transshipment techniques used to move products to the Houthis in Yemen, as there are no declared shipments to Oman or Yemen (see Figure 3).

Houthi smuggling networks are directly linked to Chinese corporations. — Figure 3: Ningbo Beilun Saige Machine Co., Ltd. network structure

Dongguan Yuze Machining Tools Co., Ltd. (东莞市钰泽机械工具有限公司):
- This Guangdong Province-based manufacturer has provided the Houthis equipment, including servo motors, electronic components and precision machining equipment such as CNC cutting tool products used to produce UAVs and missiles. This company has no publicly declared shipments and the URL listed in the sanctions designation is inactive, highlighting the likely covert nature of its activities.
International Smart Digital Interface LLC., (ISDI) (الشركة الدولية للواجهة الذكية الرقمية ذ.م.م):
- Oman-based ISDI, operated by Muaadh Ahmed Mohammed al-Haifi, coordinates with senior Houthi members to facilitate the transfer of cruise missile components, manufacturing equipment, and other dual-use materials from China (see Figure 4). These materials, sourced from firms like Ningbo Beilun and Dongguan Yuze, are vital for the production of weapons and UAVs in Yemen. ISDI’s and al-Haifi’s activities have directly enabled Houthi attacks against U.S. allies in the region. In 2020, for example, Houthi forces struck a Saudi Aramco facility in the region using a Quds- missiles that contained components that ISDI had sourced from China-based suppliers.

Hezbollah and Houthi smuggling networks are directly linked to Oman. — Figure 4: International Smart Digital Interface LLC. network structure

Guangzhou Tasneem Trading Co., Ltd. (广州塔兹宁贸易有限公司):
- This company is 100% owned by Hong Kong-based Tasneem Trading Company Limited and played a key role in sourcing and supplying components for the Houthi’s weapon manufacturing processes. Ali Abd-Al-Wahhab Muhammad Al-Wazir, a Houthi facilitator, is listed in Chinese corporate registries as chairman of the board and an individual named Wasim Abdulaziz Yahya is listed as a legal representative of the company. The company’s operations directly supported the logistical and material needs of the Houthi rebel forces.

Challenges in Monitoring and Enforcement Against Houthi Smuggling Networks

The extensive and difficult-to-monitor borders between Oman and Yemen make it challenging for international forces and local governments to intercept all smuggling activities. The cooperation between local tribal groups and smugglers also complicates enforcement efforts, as local tribes often have their own networks and methods for moving goods across the border. The use of dual-use materials, which can serve both civilian and military purposes, further complicates tracking and regulatory efforts.

Implications for Defense Strategy

The Houthis’ ability to adapt their supply chains through Oman, supported by sophisticated networks involving Chinese actors, poses a significant challenge to U.S. defense strategy in the region. However, the Houthis recently have drawn down their reserves of UAVs and anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles at a faster rate than any other time in the movement’s history, creating a potential logistical vulnerability. To effectively seize the moment and counter this threat, defense policymakers must consider a multifaceted approach beyond public sanctions. Tactical intelligence sharing, especially for the targeting of supply chains for UAVs and missile parts from China and their subsequent assembly and distribution locations within Houthi strongholds, and capacity building, particularly technical assistance for Omani customs and border security forces to improve their ability to detect and interdict illicit shipments of dual-use materials sourced from Chinese suppliers, can hinder Houthi resupply efforts.